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Abstract
This paper examines macroeconomic dynamics of household debt and hous-
ing prices. Drawing on Minsky’s insights into financial instability and cycles,
our framework combines household debt dynamics with behavioral asset price
dynamics in a Keynesian macro model. We show that endogenous boom-bust
cycles can emerge through the interaction between household debt and housing
price dynamics. The resulting long waves are combined with a Kaldorian model
of short-run business cycles.
keywords household debt, asset bubble, limit cycle, financial instability hy-
pothesis
JEL classification E12, E32, E44
1 Introduction
Minsky’s financial instability hypothesis (Minsky, 1986, 1982) has received a renewed
interest since the 2008 financial crisis. The crisis appears to vindicate the hypothesis
that a long period of prosperity sows a seed of its destruction by encouraging riskier
financial practices. A body of the literature inspired by Minsky has tried to formal-
ize various aspects of Minsky’s financial instability hypothesis (Taylor and O’Connell,
1985, Foley, 1987, Skott, 1994, Fazzari et al., 2008, Ryoo, 2010, 2013a, Chiarella and
Di Guilmi, 2011) but paid little attention to the interaction between household debt
∗Department of Finance and Economics, Adelphi University, Garden City, NY 11530. Email:
sryoo@adelphi.edu. I am very grateful to two anonymous referees whose comments and suggestions
greatly influence this version of paper. I would also like to thank Peter Skott and Gilberto Tadeu Lima
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and housing prices, which was at the center of the recent crisis. This may not be sur-
prising as Minsky’s main analysis focuses on the interaction between the firms’ liability
structure and the prices of capital assets.1
This paper draws on Minsky’s insights and examines the mechanism of instability
and cycles that emerge from the interaction between household debt accumulation and
housing prices. There is a strand of the literature that has investigated the implications
of household debt in post-Keynesian models (Palley, 1994, 1996, 2010, Dutt, 2006,
Charpe et al., 2009, 2012, Isaac and Kim, 2013). These studies stress the interaction
among household debt, aggregate demand and income distribution. Our model retains
this Keynesian emphasis on aggregate demand in the study of household debt but pays
close attention to the implications of asset price dynamics for debt accumulation which
has been by and large neglected in those models.2
The approach to modeling debt and asset price dynamics in this paper is close to
those in Ryoo (2010). The focus of the present paper, however, is not on the interaction
between corporate debt and stock prices, but on that between household debt and
housing prices.
Some key elements of the model are in order. First, the macro model we adopt
here is an extension of Kaldor’s Keynesian model of growth and distribution (Kaldor,
1956, 1966) where endogenous adjustments in profit margins play a key role in bringing
aggregate saving in line with investment. Assuming that the saving rate out of profits
is higher than that of wages, fluctuations in aggregate demand have distributional
implications in the Kaldorian framework: any rise in aggregate demand is reflected in
an increase in the profit share.3 The present paper extends the Kaldorian framework to
incorporate the borrowing-lending relation within the household sector. In our model,
borrowers are credit-constrained and the amount of their borrowing is determined by
bankers’ lending practices which in turn depend on borrowers’ income flow as well as
their balance sheet positions (net worth). As the state of household indebtedness and
housing wealth affects both borrowers’ income flow and net worth, it influences the
trajectory of borrowing and therefore borrowers’ spending. This has an implication for
aggregate demand and thus income distribution between borrowers and lenders, which
in turn feed back into debt accumulation and asset price dynamics.
Second, the Keynesian framework is combined with a behavioral model of asset
price dynamics. The specification of asset price dynamics in our model shares key
features with some behavioral literature (Beja and Goldman, 1980, Chiarella, 1992,
1Minsky often argues that the household sector plays only a secondary role in the mechanism of in-
stability because ‘Household debt-financing of consumption is almost always hedge-financing.’(Minsky,
1982)[p.32]
2The neglect of asset prices in the post-Keynesian models is somewhat curious. Many of those
models are motivated by Minsky’s theory of instability but Minsky’s emphasis on asset prices and
their role in financial instability has been largely left out of the scene.
3The idea dates back to Keynes (1930) and Robertson (1933). Hahn (1951) applies the same
mechanism to a short-run macro model.
2
Sethi, 1996, Brock and Hommes, 1998). The studies in this tradition generally stress
out-of-equilibrium dynamics in asset markets. The approach does not presume that
agents instantaneously adjust their portfolios to optimal portfolios. The discrepancy
between actual and optimal portfolios induces agents to adjust their positions which
affect the actual trajectories of asset prices. The evolution of asset prices in turn feeds
back to agents’ portfolio decisions but the effect is filtered through their expectations
and beliefs. Under uncertain environments, agents follow several rules of thumb or
various learning processes in predicting the future trajectories of prices. The adaptive
and evolutionary nature of learning and expectations formation is not dismissed in this
approach just because it violates the rational expectations hypothesis.
Our formalization retains a key Minskian feature, the centrality of the interaction
between debt and asset prices dynamics. The source of instability and cycles in our
model, however, is rooted in the household sector unlike the Minsky’s own benchmark
framework. Instability and cycles emerge from the interaction between household debt
and housing price dynamics under certain conditions. The resulting cycles are the long
waves around which short-run business cycles fluctuate. Thus our analysis formalizes,
in a particular framework, Minsky’s general idea of long waves, which is largely based
on narrative accounts.4 In addition, income distribution is endogenously determined
and interacts with debt and asset prices dynamics in our framework, whereas the role
of income distribution in Minsky’s own account of financial instability appears to be
less clear.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 sets out the model. Section 3 ana-
lyzes the properties of debt and asset price dynamics and examines the conditions for
endogenous financial cycles. Section 4 briefly discusses the empirical relevance of our
analytic results. Section 5 studies the effects of financial cycles on the real sector by
combining our model of long-run financial cycles with a Kaldorian model of business cy-
cle. Section 6 relaxes some restrictive assumptions in the baseline model and examines
some extensions. Section 7 offers some concluding remarks.
4Minsky argues ‘The more severe depressions of history occur after a period of good economic perfor-
mance, with only minor cycles disturbing a generally expanding economy’(Minsky, 1995)[p.85] and ‘the
stable mechanism which has generated the long swings centers around the cumulative changes in finan-
cial variables that take place over the long-swing expansions and contractions.’(Minsky, 1964)[p.324]
Palley (2011) stresses the importance of Minsky’s idea of long cycles. Ryoo (2010, 2013a,b,c) advocates
the long-wave interpretation of Minsky’s financial instability hypothesis and provides formal models
of Minskian long waves.
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2 Model
2.1 Firms
Firms produce a homogeneous good, using labor and capital, with fixed coefficients
technology. Let us denote output, capital and labor as Y (t), K(t) and L(t), respectively.
There is no labor hoarding in this economy but production activities do not necessarily
occur at full capacity utilization. Let us denote full capacity output at a given level of
capital stock as Y f (t) and the ratio of full-capacity output to capital as σ = Y f (t)/K(t).
Since σ is constant by assumption, the ratio of actual output to capital can serve as a
measure of capacity utilization.5
u(t) = Y (t)/K(t) (1)
Following Harrod (1939), we assume that firms have a well-defined desired rate of
capacity utilization and takes it as exogenous for simplification. In Harrod’s theory of
short-run business cycles, the movement of utilization plays a central role in generating
economic fluctuations. This is so because changes in u(t) affect firms’ investment in
physical capital, which in turn influences aggregate demand and output. If the actual
utilization rate is higher than the desired rate, firms undertake more investment to
build up productive capacity. If the actual utilization rate is lower than the desired
rate, firms slow down investment to reduce the undesired reserve of excess productive
capacity.
The Harrodian approach taken in this paper assumes that although the actual rate
of utilization may deviate from the desired rate in the short run due to unfulfilled
demand expectations and the sluggish adjustment of capital, the actual rate cannot
persistently deviate from the desired rate in the long run because the adjustment of
capital stocks is more flexible over a longer time span.6 If u(t) fluctuates around ud,
the long-run average of u(t) will be approximately equal to ud. Denoting the long-run
average rate of utilization as u(t), we then have:
u(t) = ud (2)
The purpose of our analysis in this paper is to study the dynamic properties of
5The utilization rate is defined as the ratio of actual output to full capacity output and Y (t)
Y f (t)
=
Y (t)
K(t) · K(t)Y f (t) = u(t)σ . Since σ is constant, Y (t)Y f (t) can be proxied by u(t).
6The assumptions regarding accumulation behavior have been contentious in the post Keyne-
sian/structuralist literature. Unlike our Harrodian perspective, Kaleckian models assume either that
the actual utilization rate does not have to equal the desired rate even in the long-run or that the
desired rate itself adjusts to the actual rate in the face of persistent discrepancies between the two
rates. The mechanisms and the properties of the models depend critically on the nature of invesment
behavior. Palley (2010), Dutt (2006), Isaac and Kim (2013), for instance, study the issues of consumer
debt in Kaleckian models.
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household debt accumulation and asset price movements over long periods.7 Thus we
abstract from short-run fluctuations in our analysis of long-run evolution of debt and
asset prices. In so doing, we focus only on the long-run average rate of utilization,
assuming the deviations of actual utilization from the desired rate, by and large, cancel
off each other over long periods.
(2) has implications for the long-run average rates of capital accumulation and out-
put growth. Since the utilization rate is kept at the desired rate on average, investment
will neither speed up nor slow down and therefore capital accumulation occurs at a
constant rate. The approximately constant output-capital ratio also implies that the
long-run average rate of output growth equals that of capital. In this paper, we assume
a mature economy with no technical progress.8 In such an economy, the availability of
labor constrains output expansion and the growth rate of output cannot persistently
deviate from that of labor force. Denoting the growth rate of labor force as n, we then
have:
g(t) = n (3)
where g(t) is the long-run average value of the growth rate of capital stock.9
We will use these long-run approximations, (2) and (3), throughout our analysis
of long-run financial dynamics. In other words, the utilization and the accumulation
rates in our analysis of long-run financial dynamics refer to the long-run averages u(t)
and g(t), not the actual rates. Two remarks are in order. First, (2) and (3) do not
have any connotation that actual trajectories of utilization and accumulation always
follow a steady state path. To the contrary. Harrodian investment behavior makes the
steady growth path unstable and implies that the path of capital accumulation tends
to be exploding. Labor constraints, however, may turn the exploding trajectory into
bounded fluctuations. Skott (1989), for instance, provides a mechanism of short-run
business cycles where actual u(t) and g(t) fluctuate around ud and n.10 The perpetual
fluctuations of u(t) and g(t) around ud and n justify our long run approximations.
In section 5, we integrate such a model of short cycles with our model of long-run
financial dynamics. Second, these approximations help simplify but are not necessary
to our analysis. For instance, (2) and (3) can be relaxed to allow the average values
to follow a moving average process. Section 6.1 examines such an extension. The
exogeneity of ud can be also dropped by allowing it to be endogenously determined.11
7Our focus on long-run financial dynamics is in line with Minsky’s own interpretation of his financial
instability hypothesis as a theory of long waves.
8The analysis can be extended to allow exogenous Harrod-neutral technical progress. The analytic
results, however, will be different in a Lewis-type labor-surplus economy or in an economy where
technical progress responds to the scarcity of labor supply.
9Let g(t) the actual growth rate of capital stock K(t), i.e., g(t) = K˙(t)/K(t). g(t) is the average
value of g(t) over sufficiently long periods.
10Also see Fazzari et al. (2013) for a recent contribution of a model with Harrodian instability.
11See Ryoo (2010) for details. The way of endogenizing the desired rate of utilization in Ryoo (2010)
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To focus on household debt, the analysis abstracts from the firms’ debt. Firms
finance real investment and dividends using profits and equity issues. Firms pay out a
constant fraction of profits net of depreciation to their shareholders.
p(t)I(t) + (1− sf )[Π(t)− δp(t)K(t)] = Π(t) + v(t)N˙(t) (4)
where p(t) is the output price, I(t) real investment, 1− sf the dividend pay-out ratio,
Π(t) gross profits, δ the rate of depreciation of capital stock, v(t) the unit price of
shares, and N(t) the amount of new share issues by firms. N(t) is the endogneous
variable that ensures (4) holds.
By dividing both sides by p(t)K(t), rearranging the terms gives us
I(t)
K(t)
− δ ≡ g(t) = sf [pi(t)u(t)− δ] + v(t)N˙(t)
p(t)K(t)
(5)
where pi(t) is the share of profits in total revenue, i.e. pi(t) ≡ Π(t)
p(t)Y (t)
. The interpretation
of (5) is as follows. The profit share pi(t) is determined endogenously (see section 2.3).
From (2) and (3), u(t) = ud and g(t) = n. Therefore equity finance must adjust to fill
the gap between investment and retained earnings.12
2.2 Households
The overall structure of the economy in this paper is a modified version of a two-class
economy that is standard in the structuralist/post-Keynesian literature. The household
sector is divided into workers’ and capitalists’ households. Workers use bank loans and
wage income to finance their consumption and to pay interest on loans. They do not
hold firms’ stocks but own housing wealth. Capitalists hold stocks and receive dividend
income. In addition to dividend income, they make deposits in banks and earn interest
income. In the baseline model, we leave out the complications that naturally arise from
capitalists’ portfolio decision problems by making a heroic assumption that capitalists
do not hold housing and the composition of stocks and deposts in capitalists’ portfolios
is constant. Section 6.2 drops these assumptions and briefly looks at the implications of
capitalists’ endogenous changes in capitalists’ portfolios and the distribution of housing
between classes.
2.2.1 Workers
The workers’ consumption and total amount of outstanding debt are denoted as Cw(t)
and M(t), respectively. The amount of the workers’ housing stock is denoted as Hw.
is different from that in various Kaleckian models.
12 If retained earnings exceed investment, firms buy back their stocks from shareholders. Increasing
stock buybacks have been a characteristic feature of the U.S. economy since the early 1980s (Skott
and Ryoo, 2008).
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The level of Hw is assumed to be fixed in the baseline analysis, but we relax this
assumption in section 6.3.13 The assumption of constant housing stock14 is not necessary
to our analytic results but simplifies the analysis. Section 6.3 relaxes this assumption
and introduces a construction sector.
Workers have total wage income, W (t):
W (t) = p(t)Y (t)− Π(t)
The interest rate on loans is assumed to be equal to the rate on deposits.15 We also
assume that banks’ assets consist of loans only and banking entails no cost but its
payments on deposits. The economy is cashless and all transactions are made via
bank accounts. Under these assumptions, the equality between the rates on loans and
deposits implies that the amount of workers’ loans, M(t), equals that of capitalists’
deposits. The amount of workers’ outstanding debt measured in physical capital units
is denoted as m(t),16 i.e.,
m(t) =
M(t)
p(t)K(t)
(6)
Workers in the aggregate have the following budget constraint:
Cw(t)
K(t)
=
W (t)− i(t)M(t) + M˙(t)
p(t)K(t)
=
W (t)− i(t)M(t) + Mˆ(t)M(t)
p(t)K(t)
=
[1− pi(t)]p(t)Y (t)− i(t)M(t) + (pˆ(t) + n+ mˆ)M(t)
p(t)K(t)
= [1− pi(t)]ud − rm(t) + m˙(t) + nm(t) (7)
13Even withHw fixed, the distribution of the housing stock changes as a result of the transactions
among worker households. The current framework allows housing rental within class, but not between
classes. Any rental income on housing is netted out by the rental payment by other members within
the same class. To be concrete, consider
C˙w +Rwp + p
hH˙wd + D˙
w = W +Rwi + iD˙
w + phH˙ds − iM˙wh − iM˙wo + M˙wh + M˙wo .
where H˙wd and H˙
w
s are the purchase and sale of houses; p
h the housing price; W wage income; i the
nominal interest rate; Rwp and R
w
i rental payment and income, respectively; M
w
h and M
w
o the stock of
home mortgages and other debts; Dw workers’ bank deposits. The payment and the receipt of housing
rents are netted out Rp = Ri; the assumption of constant housing stock means Hwd = H
w
s ; setting
M = Mwh +M
w
o −Dw, we obtain the budget equation (7).
14The assumption of constant housing stock is also found in Iacoviello (2005)
15The assumption can be relaxed without affecting main results by allowing a margin between the
two rates which may depend positively on the workers’ indebtedness, assuming bankers’ profits from
the existence of the margin are fully distributed to capitalists’ households.
16Throughout this paper, nominal (real) variables are normalized by the value of (real) capital.
Due to our long-run assumption that capital grows at the natural rate on average, the quantity of a
normalized variable is proportional to the quantity in per capita terms (or in efficiency units).
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where i(t) and r are the nominal and real interest rates on loans, and the two rates
are related via the familiar Fisher equation (i(t) = r + pˆ(t)). The last two terms,
m˙(t) + nm(t), in (7) represents the amount of real borrowing (scaled by capital stock):
on a steady growth path, the amount of real borrowing equals nm(t), but out of steady
growth path, the amount of borrowing is greater than nm(t) if m˙(t) > 0 or less than
nm(t) if m˙(t) < 0. The size of m˙(t), the pace of credit supply, is determined by bankers.
The real interest rate on loans, r, is assumed to be set exogenously by bankers.
Workers face a credit constraint imposed by banks and thus the level of consumption
is limited by the availability of consumer credit.17 In our specification, the amount
of credit depends positively on workers’ income and net worth. Banks use borrowers’
income (=wages net of interest paid) as an indicator of their creditworthiness. In
the face of any increase in perceived risk of borrowers, bankers, we assume, respond
by adjusting credit supply rather than adjusting the loan rate because they may see
increasing the rate as undesirable due to typical rationing reasons. Financial innovation
also tends to make credit supply more elastistic with limited variations in the interest
rate.
The effect of net worth on household borrowing is one of the important features in
this model. This effect can be justified by the usual collateral effect: houses may serve
as collateral and relax households’ credit constraints.18 Based on these considerations,
the dynamics of workers’ debt is given by19
m˙(t) = µ (yw(t), ωw(t)) ; µy > 0 µω > 0 (8)
where
yw(t) ≡ [1− pi(t)]ud − rm(t) (9)
and
ωw(t) ≡ hw(t)−m(t)
hw(t) is the value of housing wealth scaled by the value of productive capital
hw(t) =
ph(t)Hw(t)
p(t)K(t)
and thus ωw(t) is workers’ net worth. The credit supply function (8) highlights Min-
sky’s emphasis on margins of safety in banks’ lending decisions. According to Minsky,
17Dutt (2006), Palley (2010), Charpe et al. (2012) and Isaac and Kim (2013) also consider credit-
constrained borrowers but they do so without introducing the effect of asset prices on credit supply.
18A literature has studied the implications of the collateral-credit-consumption nexus for the mone-
tary transmission mechanism, e.g., Aoki et al. (2004), Iacoviello (2005).
19Equation (8) can be rewritten as Mˆ(t) = pˆ(t)+n+[µ (yw(t), ωw(t)) /m(t)], implying bankers keep
the growth of outstanding loans in line with the sum of the long-run average rates of inflation and
economic growth (pˆ+n) if the workers’ profile of income and net worth satisfies m˙ = µ (yw(t), ωw(t)) =
0. Higher (lower) income or net worth accelerates credit supply at a rate above (below) pˆ+ n.
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‘ ...bankers are not simpletons who accept all that is put forward for them to finance
as being worthy of financing. In their relations with businessmen, households and gov-
ernments that require financing, bankers are designated sceptics.’(Minsky, 1996)[p.76]
Therefore, Minsky argues, banks insist on margins of safety when they consider granting
loans. The ‘fundamental margin of safety’ is the excess of a unit’s expected operating
income over the payment committed by debt contracts. In our formulation, the influ-
ence of yw(t) on credit supply captures the fundamental margin of safety. The collateral
value is another margin of safety in bankers’ lending decisions.
(7) and (8) determine the consumption of worker households:
Cw(t)
K(t)
≡ cw(t) = yw(t) + µ (yw(t), ωw(t)) + nm(t) (10)
An increase in income raises the workers’ consumption directly and indirectly via its
effect on borrowing. The workers’ net worth stimulates consumption by relaxing the
credit constraint.
We assume that workers has a desired ratio of housing stock to consumption and the
desired ratio depends positively on expected capital gains on housing (and negatively
on the constant real interest rate).
ph(t)Hd(t) = η(ρe(t))p(t)Cw(t), η′ > 0 (11)
(11), along with (10), is part of the workers’ integrated decisions on consumption and
balance sheet positions. By assumption, housing is the only asset for workers, but
workers use debt and constantly make their balance sheet positions. Under our speci-
fication, workers see as desired the position of their balance sheet consistent with (10)
and (11). Since workers are credit-constrained by bankers, the size of debt is not under
their control and therefore their desired balance sheet position is achieved by adjust-
ing the size of their balance sheet, i.e., the size of housing wealth. Specification (15)
plausibly assumes that the workers’ desired balance sheet position is determined with
reference to their level of consumption.20 Equation (11) implies that the demand for
housing stock is given by:
Hd(t) =
η(ρe(t))p(t)Cw(t)
ph(t)
(12)
Following the disequilibrium approach to asset prices, we assume that excess demand in
the housing market does not vanish instantaneously21 and causes housing price inflation.
20The early introduction of stock-flow specifications of consumption/portfolio behavior is found in
Skott (1981).
21The housing market will be always in equilibrium if it instantaneously establishes the real housing
price of ph(t)/p(t) = η(ρe(t))Cw(t)/Hw. The assumption of instantaneous market clearing sounds
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More specifically, we consider
pˆh(t) = pˆ(t) + n+ κ
(
Hd(t)
Hw
− 1
)
, κ > 0 (13)
where pˆ(t) + n amounts to the housing price inflation required to support a steady
growth path with a constant housing/capital ratio (i.e., housing wealth grows in line
with the size of the economy on a steady growth path), and the deviations of the rate
of housing price inflation from the steady state value are driven by the excess demand
in housing market.
Denoting hw(t) ≡ ph(t)Hw/(p(t)K(t)), (12) and (13) can be rewritten as22
h˙w(t) = κ [η(ρe(t))cw(t)− hw(t)] (14)
In other words, the underlying disequilibrium dynamics in the housing market can be
seen as a gradual adjustment of housing wealth to the desired level.
Households’ expectations on capital gains are assumed to follow an adaptive mech-
anism:
ρ˙e(t) = ν[ρ(t)− ρe(t)] (15)
where ν is a positive constant and ρ(t) is the rate of capital gains, i.e. (real) housing
price inflation. Thus using the definition of hw(t), the rate of housing price inflation is
given by:
ρ(t) ≡ p˙
h(t)
ph(t)
− p˙(t)
p(t)
=
h˙w(t)
hw(t)
+ n (16)
Substituting (14) and (16) in (15), the dynamics of expected housing price inflation can
be written as
ρ˙e(t) = ν
(
h˙w(t)
hw(t)
+ n− ρe(t)
)
= ν
(
κ
[
η(ρe(t), yb(t))− hw(t)]
hw(t)
+ n− ρe(t)
)
(17)
extreme and then the question is how fast the adjustment of real housing prices is. This is utterly an
empirical question. It should be noted, however, that the slow adjustment of real housing prices does
not imply that nominal housing prices are sticky: the movement of nominal housing prices may have
an order of frequencies close to that of output prices. The decades-long process of ‘fixing the household
balance sheets’ after housing bubbles collapsed in Japan and the US may provide an anecdotal evidence
for our disequilibrium dynamics approach.
22Equation (14) can be derived from the interaction between chartists and fundamentalists with
constant wealth distribution. See Appendix A.
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2.2.2 Capitalists: ultimate lenders
Capitalists’ income scaled by capital stock, yc(t), is given by
yc(t) ≡ (1− sf )(Π(t)− δp(t)K(t)) + rM(t)
p(t)K(t)
= (1− sf )(pi(t)ud − δ) + rm(t) (18)
Disregarding capitalists’ housing wealth for the moment, their wealth, ωc(t) consists of
stocks and deposits:
ωc(t) ≡ v(t)N(t) +M(t)
p(t)K(t)
Denoting as α(t) the ratio of equities to deposits, the capitalists’ wealth can be rewritten
as
ωc(t) = [1 + α(t)]m(t) (19)
In general, α(t) is affected by a number of factors including the rates of return on stocks
and deposits. For instance, consider the following simple specification:
α(t) = α∗
(
(1− sf )(Π(t)− δp(t)K(t))
v(t)N(t)
, r
)
where α(t) depends positively on the dividend yield (and negatively on the interest
rate on deposits). One can easily show, however, that this specification makes capi-
talist wealth increasing in their dividend income and deposit holdings, and, under a
conventional specification of consumption such as (20) below, the main analytic results
in this paper are qualitatively the same as in the case where α(t) is constant. Therefore,
we take α(t) as exogenous in the baseline model for the sake of simplicity.
Alternatively, α(t) may be endogenized along the line of the disequilibrium approach
similar to our specification of housing market dynamics. In this case, expectations of
capital gains on stocks may produce another source of boom and bust cycles.23 In
addition, it is natural to introduce housing into capitalists’ portfolio problem in such
an extension. Section 6.2 considers an extended model along the lines.
We adopt a conventional specification of consumption behavior for capitalists: their
consumption depends on income and wealth.
Cc(t)
K(t)
= f(yc(t), ωc(t)); 0 < fy < 1, fω > 0 (20)
where fy and fω is capitalist’ marginal propensity to consume out of income and wealth,
respectively.
23Endogenous changes in portfolios play an important role in many models of boom-bust cycles.
See, for instance, (Asada et al., 2010, Ryoo, 2010, Skott, 2013, Taylor and O’Connell, 1985).
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2.3 Determination of income distribution
Aggregate consumption, C(t), consists of lenders’ and borrowers’ consumption.
C(t)
K(t)
= f(yc(t), ωc(t)) + yw(t) + µ(yw(t), ωw(t)) +m(t)n (21)
≡ χ(pi(t), hw(t),m(t))
Let us examine how consumption demand responds to changes in income distribution
and the key financial variables.
χpi = −ud[1− (1− sf )fy + µy] ≡ −ud∆ < 0
χhw = µω > 0
χm = [rfy + fω(1 + α)] + [n− r(1 + µy)− µω] R 0
Aggregate consumption is decreasing in pi(t): a rise in pi(t) represents the distribution
of income in favor of capitalists whose propensity to consume is lower than workers.
Consumption is increasing in hw(t): the higher the collateral value the more amount
workers can borrow and the more consumption. The effect of changes in m(t) on
consumption, however, is ambiguous. Capitalists’ consumption will unambiguously
increase as their income and wealth increase but workers’ consumption may decrease
as their burden of debt increases. The equilibrium condition for the goods market is
given by
ud =
C(t)
K(t)
+ n+ δ
= χ(pi(t), hw(t),m(t)) + n+ δ (22)
Following Keynes (1930) and Kaldor (1956), the product market equilibrium is
achieved through variations in the profit share. The validity of our application of
the Kaldorian adjustment mechanism to longer-run financial cycles depends on two
things: first, Marshallian ultra-short equilibrium is stable, and, second, the system of
short cycles generate bounded fluctuations of accumulation around the natural rate.
The first condition is met if aggregate saving is increasing in the profit share. This
assumption is satisfied if the profit earners’ propensity to save is higher than the wage
earners’, but note the latter condition is not necessary for the Marshallian stability in
the presence of retained earning.24 The condition certainly holds in our framework,
i.e. χpi < 0. The second condition depends on the details of the system of short cycles,
and our specification we borrowed from Skott (1989) produces the desired property (see
section 5).
24If firms retain a fraction of profits, the saving propensity out of profits will be greater than that
of wages even if there is no difference in personal saving rates.
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Since χpi 6= 0, (22) implicitly defines pi(t) as a function of m(t) and hw(t):
pi∗(t) = p˜i(hw(t),m(t)) (23)
such that χ(pi∗(t), hw(t),m(t))+n+δ = ud. The effects of financial variables on income
distribution are given by
p˜ihw = −χhw
χpi
=
µω
ud∆
> 0 (24)
p˜im = −χm
χpi
=
[rfy + fω(1 + α)] + [n− r(1 + µy)− µω]
ud∆
R 0 (25)
The larger housing wealth hw(t) the higher the profit share. An increase in housing
wealth allows workers to take on more loans, which stimulates their consumption de-
mand. The increase in aggregate demand raises profit margins. The effect of consumer
debt m(t) on the profit share, however, is ambiguous as the effect of m(t) on aggregate
demand can be either way.
The workers’ income is important for the behavior of the system. Substituting (23)
in (9), we write
y˜w(m(t), hw(t)) ≡ [1− p˜i(hw(t),m(t))]ud − rm(t) (26)
Using (24), (25) and (26), we have
y˜wh = −
µω
∆
< 0 (27)
y˜wm =
− [{fω(1 + α) + n}+ rsffy]+ µω
∆
(28)
The workers’ net income is decreasing in housing wealth (eq. 27). An increase in
housing wealth increases borrowing and consumption demand, which is reflected in
higher profit margins. The increase in the profit share shift income away from workers
to capitalists.
The macroeconomic effect of changes in workers’ indebtedness on their net income is
ambiguous. Inspecting (28), the ambiguity comes from the last term in the numerator,
µω. This positive term is explained by the negative effect of m on net worth and
demand, which tends to reduce the profit share and to increase the workers’ income.
If this effect is small, then an increase in the debt ratio has a negative effect on the
workers’ income.
3 Dynamics
3.1 Pure debt dynamics
Let us first examine the mechanism of debt dynamics in isolation, assuming that housing
prices do not respond to excess demand (κ = 0). Under our specification of housing
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price dynamics, this means that real housing price inflation coincides with the natural
rate of growth in the economy, i.e., hw(t) remains constant.
Plugging (10) and (26) in (8), we have
m˙(t) = µ(y˜w(m(t), hw(t)), hw(t)−m(t)) ≡ F (m(t), hw(t)) (29)
Let us first examine the sign of Fm, the effect of variations in m(t) on m˙(t).
∂m˙(t)
∂m(t)
≡ Fm = µyy˜cm − µω (30)
If the workers’ net income y˜w remains constant, an increase in m(t) reduces credit
supply because of a fall in net wealth (see the the second term, −µω, in (30)). The
fall in net worth also affects credit supply via its effect on income distribution. This
induced effect, however, is dominated by the initial negative effect of changes in net
worth on credit supply. Algebraically,
Fm = µy ·
(
− [{fω(1 + α) + n}+ rsffy]+ µω
∆
)
− µω
= −µy
[{fω(1 + α) + n}+ rsffy]
∆
−
(
1− µy
∆
)
µω < 0 (31)
The inequality in (31) comes from the fact that µy/∆ < 1. Thus the initial negative
impact effect of m(t) on m˙(t) always dominates, i.e. Fm < 0.
Next an increase in hw(t) speeds up debt accumulation, Fhw > 0. An increase in
hw(t) raises m˙(t) through the collateral-lending channel, holding y˜w(t) constant. The
decrease in y˜w(t) caused by the rise in hw(t) partially offsets the initial positive effect
of hw(t) on m˙(t). The overall effect will be unambiguously positive:
∂m˙(t)
∂hw(t)
≡ Fhw = µyy˜wh + µω =
µω[1− (1− sf )fy]
∆
> 0 (32)
With hw(t) taken as exogenous, (29) is a one-dimensional differential equation of
m(t), which we call ‘pure’ debt dynamics in the sense that the debt dynamics is not
disturbed by the movement of asset prices. Proposition 1 shows that the pure debt
dynamics converges to a unique stationary point and the stationary debt ratio in the
uni-dimensional system is increasing in the workers’ housing wealth (hw(t)).
Proposition 1 For a given hw(t) > 0, (29) has a unique stationary point m∗(t) in
(0,m+) such that F (m∗(t), hw(t)) = 0 if there exists a debt ratio m+ > 0 for which
F (0, hw(t)) > 0 > F (m+, hw(t)) (33)
The stationary point is globally stable and increasing in hw(t).
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Proof. Since ∂m˙(t)
∂m(t)
= Fm < 0, F is strictly decreasing in m(t) for a given h
w(t). With
the condition (33) given, the intermediate value theorem25 ensures that there exists
m∗(t) in (0,m+) such that
F (m∗(t), hw(t)) = 0 (34)
(34) implicitly defines m∗(t) as a function of hw(t) and therefore allows us to write
m∗(t) ≡ m˜(hw(t))
m∗(t) is globally stable because ∂m˙(t)
∂m(t)
= Fm < 0 for all m(t). Moreover
m˜′(hw(t)) = −Fhw
Fm
> 0
since Fm < 0 and Fhw > 0. 
The interpretation of (33) is straightforward: if workers have no initial debt, then
banks perceive their financial structure as robust and banks are willing to start pro-
viding loans (F (0, hw(t)) > 0); if workers are highly indebted, banks restrict loans
(F (m+, hw(t)) < 0). Since m˙(t) is decreasing in m(t), there must exist a stationary
debt ratio between 0 and m+.
The pure debt dynamics is stable for a given level of assets hw(t). Increases in
the borrowers’ wealth, however, stimulate credit supply through the collateral-lending
channel. In Minsky’s terminology, a high level of borrowers’ assets tends to validate high
indebtedness. The stationary debt ratio, m˜(hw(t)), can be seen as the debt ratio that
bankers are content with for a given level of assets. Since m˜′(hw(t)) > 0, the desired
debt ratio depends positively on housing wealth. This aspect of the model captures
the importance of the effect of asset prices on debt dynamics in Minsky’s theory of
financial instability. Minsky distinguishes ‘loans based on the value of cash flows’ from
‘loans based on the value of pledged collateral’ and emphasizes that the latter tends to
destabilize the financial system (Minsky, 1986)[pp. 233-234].
...the overall fragility-robustness of the financial structure, upon which the
cyclical stability of the economy depends, emerges out of loans made by
bankers. A cash-flow orientation by bankers is conducive to sustaining a
robust financial structure. An emphasis by bankers on the collateral value
and the expected values of assets is conducive to the emergence of a fragile
financial structure (Minsky, 1986)[p.234]
In our credit supply function, (8), the effect of the workers’ net income captures the
‘cash-flow orientation by bankers’ whereas the effect of net worth represents ‘the empha-
sis by bankers on the collateral value and the expected values of assets.’ The stability
25We assume throughout this paper that the relevant functions are continuously differential.
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result in Proposition 1 shows that, without the effect of housing prices on credit sup-
ply, an increase in indebtedness of workers has a self-stabilizing feedback because it
increases the workers’ burden of debt service and makes bankers more skeptic about
the borrowers’ ability to repay their debt. This confirms Minsky’s argument that ‘a
cash-flow orientation by bankers is conducive to sustaining a robust financial structure.’
As will be shown, the stabilizing debt dynamics is disturbed by fluctuations in housing
prices.
3.2 Pure asset price dynamics
Instead of (8), let us consider a different regime of the bankers’ credit supply: the
amount of total loans grows at pˆ(t) +n with no reference to the worker’s income or net
worth. In this case, the amount of debt per worker remains constant and the properties
of housing price dynamics can be examined independently of debt dynamics.
With m˙(t) = 0 and m(t) = m, (14) and (17) form a two-dimensional pure asset
price dynamics:
h˙w(t) = κ [η(ρe(t))cw(m)− hw(t)] (14)
ρ˙e = ν
(
κ [η(ρe(t))cw(m)− hw(t)]
hw(t)
+ n− ρe(t)
)
(17)
where cw(m) corresponds to the level of workers’ consumption when m˙(t) = 0. Note
that cw(m) is independent of h(t) since the effect of h(t) on the goods market works
only through the collateral-lending channel which is absent under the assumption of
m˙(t) = 0. One can easily show that cw ′(m) < 0: higher debt squeezes the worker’
consumption due to the strong negative effect of higher burden of debt servicing.26
There exists a unique stationary point of this system:
h˜ = η(n)cw(m) and ρ˜e = n (35)
To see the stability property of the system (14) and (17), consider the Jacobian
matrix evaluated at the stationary point
J˜ =
[−κ κη′cw
−νκ
h˜
ν
(
κη′
η
− 1
)]
tr(J˜) = −κ+ ν
(
κη′
η
− 1
)
R 0
det(J˜) = νκ > 0
26Formally, we have:
cw′(m) =
−fy[rsf + n(1− sf )]− fω(1 + α)
1− fy(1− sf ) < 0
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The determinant is always positive, and therefore the saddle path instability is excluded.
The stability of the system depends on the sign of the trace. The stationary point (35)
is locally stable (unstable) if and only if the trace of the Jacobian is negative (positive).
Thus we have
Proposition 2 With m(t) fixed, the stationary point of the asset price dynamics (14)
and (17) is locally stable if −κ+ν
(
κη′
η
− 1
)
< 0 and locally unstable if −κ+ν
(
κη′
η
− 1
)
>
0
Proposition 2 tells us that local instability requires η′, κ and ν to be sufficiently
large. If the value of these parameters is sufficiently large, an increase in capital gains
stimulates the demand for housing stock which fuels a further appreciation in housing
prices. Thus rising hw(t) and ρe(t) will reinforce each other. Moreover, the introduction
of a plausible nonlinearity into the η-function may turn instability into undamped
perpetual cycles. If η(ρe(t)) is bounded from above and below by positive constants,
the exploding tendency of the actual housing stock is likely tamed in the neighborhood
of the specified bounds, thereby creating a turning point. The underlying mechanism –
a positive feedback between actual and expected outcomes under extrapolating behavior
– is a characteristic feature of early models of boom and bust cycles (see the related
literature in section 1). Proposition 3 corroborates the earlier result in the current
context.
Proposition 3 The trajectories of hw(t) and ρe(t) generated by (14) and (17) converge
to a closed orbit if −κ+ ν
(
κη′
η
− 1
)
> 0 and η(ρe(t)) is bounded such that
0 < η ≤ η(ρe(t)) ≤ η (36)
for all ρe(t).
Proof See Appendix B.
(36) ensures that housing wealth hw(t) as well as the rate of capital gains ρ(t)
are bounded. It is easy to show that the boundedness of ρ(t) implies that of ρe(t)
under our adaptive specification (15). Given the boundedness of (hw(t), ρe(t)) and the
existence of a unique and unstable equilibrium, the emergence of a stable limit cycle
is a direct consequence of the Poincare-Bendixon theorem (Hirsch and Smale, 1974).
The economic story behind Proposition 3 is not difficult to grasp. Suppose that ρ(t) >
ρe(t) and hw(t) < hd(t). Then a housing market boom follows: housing wealth hw(t)
and expected capital gains ρe(t) increase. There will be a positive feedback between
increasing hw(t) and ρe(t) for a while. Such an upward movement is unsustainable
because as actual housing wealth (hw(t)) gets closer to η, even a large increase in the
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expected rate translates into only a small adjustment of desired housing wealth, which
in turn generates only a small rise in actual capital gains. It will result in sluggish
increases in capital gains and, at some point, the relation between the actual and
expected capital gains will be reversed so that ρ(t) < ρe(t). A period of optimism then
will give a way to a period of pessimistic expectations. As hd(t) falls below hw(t), the
level of actual housing wealth starts to fall.
Before moving onto the analysis of the interaction of debt and asset price dynamics
in a three dimensional system, it would be instructive to look at the effects of changes
in indebtedness (m(t)) on the system of asset price dynamics. First, higher indebted-
ness of workers is associated with a higher steady state value of housing wealth in pure
asset price dynamics. This suggests that high indebtedness induced by a housing boom,
if any, tends to constrain the upward instability of housing prices by shifting income
distribution against workers and reducing their consumption. Second, the assumption
of m˙(t) = 0 implies that changes in h(t) do not affect income distribution. Once the
assumption is replaced by our credit supply function (8), increases in housing prices
stimulate the workers’ borrowing in the collateral-lending channel. In our framework,
the rise in workers’ borrowing has a paradoxical effect on income distribution and con-
sumption: it tends to further squeeze the workers’ consumption as the rise in aggregate
demand driven by increasing borrowing induces a large shift in income distribution in
favor of capitalists. The reduction in the workers’ consumption decreases their desired
housing demand.
3.3 Putting Debt and asset price dynamics together
Putting together debt and asset price dynamics, we now have a three dimensional
dynamical system:
m˙(t) = µ(y˜w(m(t), hw(t)), hw(t)−m(t)) ≡ F (m(t), hw(t)) (37)
h˙w(t) = κ [η(ρe(t))c˜w(m(t), hw(t)))− hw(t)] ≡ G(m(t), hw(t), ρe(t)) (38)
ρ˙e(t) = ν
[
G(m(t), hw(t), ρe(t))
hw(t)
+ n− ρe(t)
]
(39)
Let us first examine the existence of a steady state. Proposition 4 shows that there
exists a unique steady state under plausible conditions.
Proposition 4 There exists a unique stationary point of (37)-(39), (m(t), hw(t), ρe(t))
= (m∗, h∗, n) such that 0 < m∗ < m+ and 0 < h∗ = η(n)cw(m∗) < h+ if m+ and h+
are chosen such that
F ∗(0, 0) > 0 > F ∗(m+, h+) (40)
0 < η(n)cw(m˜∗(h+)) < h+ (41)
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where F ∗(m(t), h(t)) = µ[yw(m(t)), hw(t) − m(t)], yw(m(t)) stands for the workers’
income under m˙(t) = 0, and m˜∗(h(t)) is the solution of m(t) for F ∗(m(t), h(t)) = 0.
The meaning of condition (40) is similar to that of assumption (33) that was already
discussed in section 3.1. Condition (41) implies, assuming the workers’ debt is kept at
what bankers want it to be (m(t) = m˜∗(h(t))), their desired housing wealth is positive
if h(t) = 0,27 but the desired housing wealth falls short of the actual holdings if the
latter is sufficiently large. The system therefore permits an interior positive solution of
h(t) in the steady state. Since cw(m(t)) is decreasing in m(t) and m˜(h(t)) is increasing
in h(t), the desired housing wealth is decreasing in h(t) and the steady state solution
is unique.
Before we turn to the logic of instability and cycles, it may be illuminating to look
at a condition under which the system exhibits stability.
Proposition 5 If ν is sufficiently low, the stationary point of the dynamical system
(37)-(39) is locally stable.
Proof See Appendix C.
Proposition 5 tells us that if the workers’ expectations of capital gains is relatively
insensitive to the movement of capital gains, the steady state of the system is locally
stable. In an extreme case with ν = 0, ρe(t) remains constant forever and the system
(37)-(39) is reduced to a two dimensional sub-system of (37)-(38) given a fixed ρe(t).
The trace of the sub-system is always negative and its determinant is positive.28 Thus
the trajectory will converge to a stable point. Proposition 5 suggests that if ν is suffi-
ciently small, the system retains such a stable property. This stability result highlights
the importance of the dynamics of expectations and capital gains for the behavior of the
system. The following proposition shows that the system loses its stability as expected
capital gains change more sensitively to variations in actual capital gains.
Proposition 6 Suppose that
Gρe
hw∗ − 1 > 0. There exists a Hopf bifurcation value of ν
for the system of(37)-(39). As ν rises passing through the bifurcation value, the system
loses its stability, giving rise to a limit cycle.
Proof See Appendix C.
Asset prices dynamics strongly shape debt dynamics. An increase in housing wealth
in a booming housing market accelerates credit supply as it raises the workers’ collateral,
i.e. Fhw > 0. Therefore an asset bubble (bust) is typically accompanied by increasing
27Since cw(m˜∗(h(t)) is decreasing in h(t), η(n)cw(m˜∗(h+)) > 0 implies η(n)cw(m˜∗(0)) > 0.
28The detailed expression for the determinant FmGh − FhGm is found in the proof of proposition 7
in Appendix B.
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Figure 2: capital gains on housing wealth (housing price inflation)
(decreasing) indebtedness. Figure 1 illustrates such boom and bust dynamics of hous-
ing wealth and the debt ratio.29 The movement of capital gains on housing wealth is
the driving force behind the boom and bust cycles. Figure 2 depicts the movements
of the expected and the actual rates of capital gains (= housing price inflation). Dur-
ing a boom, the rate of housing price inflation exceeds the expected rate, driving up
the expected inflation rate, and during a downturn, the actual rate is lower than the
expected rate, dragging down the expected rate.
Proposition 6 tells us the local property of the system. The following proposition
29Figures 1, 2 and 6 are based on the same parameter values and functions: u = 0.5, δ = 0.08,
sf = 0.5, r = 0.03, α = 1, n = 0.03, µ(yw(t), ωw(t)) = 0.1yw(t) + 0.1ωw(t) − 0.0606, f(yl(t), ωl(t)) =
0.75yl(t) + 0.048ωl(t), κ = 0.2, ν = 0.2, and η(ρe(t)) = 1.733 + tanh[23(ρe − 0.03)]. The purpose of
the simulation is to demonstrate the emergence of endogenous cycles itself, and producing realistic
details of long waves, including the asymmetry of boom and bust, may require the precise calibration
of functional forms as well as parameter values.
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Figure 3: household debt and housing wealth
m(t) and h(t) are three-year moving average values of ‘credit market instruments’
(household liabilities) and household real estate, respectively, taken from Table B.100 in
Flow of Funds Accounts of the United States (1952-2012)
provides a useful global property of the system behavior and complements the local
analysis.
Proposition 7 The trajectories of (m(t), hw(t), ρe(t)) in the system of (37)-(39) are
bounded if (36), (40) and (41) are satisfied.
Proof See Appendix B.
Due to the boundedness of the trajectories, the local instability of the fixed point
engenders perpetual fluctuations.
4 A cursory glance at the U.S. data
We have examined conditions under which the model generates instability ad endoge-
nous cycles. The purpose of this section is not to provide conclusive empirical evidence
for the theoretical framework but to present a preliminary look at the empirical data.
Our model can generate clockwise cycles on the (m(t), hw(t))-space (see Figure 1).
Using the U.S. data from 1952 to 2012, the picture is not clear-cut but we can identify
two periods each of which appears to have seen a clockwise cycle of debt and housing
wealth. The first period is the one between 1952 and the early 1980s and saw a relatively
small cycle of debt and housing wealth (Figure 3). Household debt – scaled by the
capital stock of the nonfarm nonfinanical corporation sector – had risen from 0.26
in 1952 to 0.55 in 1966. The ratio of housing wealth to capital stock had increased
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The definition and source of h(t) are the same as in Figure 3. ρ(t) is the three year moving
average value of the annual percentage change in the Case-Shiller housing price index.
moderately from 0.85 in 1952 to 1.02 in 1963. The ratio of housing wealth to capital
had declined from 1963 until 1977.
The next period, starting in the early 1980s, saw much more dramatic increases
in both household debt and housing wealth than the previous period. The period
of financial expansion, interrupted only by a relatively mild downturn in the housing
market in the 1990s, lasted for more than twenty years until 2007. The housing market
collapse in 2007 and the deleverging in the household sector thereafter are shown vividly
in Figure 3. The boom-bust cycle in this period is also reflected in the movement of the
rate of housing price inflation. Our model produces the counter-clockwise cycle in the
(ρ, h)-space. Figure 4 identifies a similar pattern from the data: a sustained increase in
housing price inflation was associated with the rapid accumulation of housing wealth for
a period run-up to the financial crisis. Both housing wealth and housing price inflation
had plummeted thereafter.
In our model, rising borrowers’ net worth is a driving force behind credit expansion
during a boom: m˙(t) depends positively on net worth ωw(t). Figure 5 shows that
increases (decreases) in indebtedness are largely associated with high (low) net worth.
5 Real effects of financial dynamics: long waves and
short cycles
A prolonged period of prosperity is sustained by increasing asset prices. Such strong
asset markets allow households to increase their borrowing and have a positive effect
on aggregate demand. In our model, increases in aggregate demand result in increasing
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Sources : The definition of h(t) and m(t) are the same as in Figure 3. ∆m(t) is the
annual change in m(t). All variables are the three year moving average values.
profitability (see Figure 6).
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Figure 6: Profit share and housing wealth
The fluctuations of the profit share caused by changes in housing wealth and the
debt ratio influence production, employment and accumulation. To examine the real
effect of financial cycles, we explicitly introduce a model of short-run business cycles.
The basic structure of the model of short cycles below is identical with that in Skott
(1989).
The short-run profit share pis(t) is derived from the goods market equilibrium. In
order to obtain pis(t),we use the actual utilization rate u(t) instead of its long-run
average (ud). Changes in the actual utilization rate drive actual accumulation over
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short periods. The short-run investment function is given by30:
g(t) = n+ φ(u(t)− ud), φ′(·) > 0, φ(0) = 0 (42)
Using this investment function and the consumption function evaluated at the actual
rate of utilization, we have the equilibrium condition for the goods market:
[1− pis(t)]u(t)− rm(t) + µ([1− pis(t)]u(t)− rm(t), hw(t)−m(t)) + nm(t)
+f((1− sf )[pis(t)u(t)− δ] + rm(t), (1 + α)m(t))
+n+ φ(u(t)− ud) = u(t) (43)
The solution of pis(t) can be written as a function of u(t) as well as m(t) and hw(t):
pis(t) ≡ p˜is(u(t),m(t), hw(t)), p˜isu > 0, p˜ish > 0, p˜ism R 0 (44)
The Harrodian approach assumes that investment is more sensitive to changes in uti-
lization than saving and the condition is formally given by
φ′ > 1− [1− pis(t)](1− fy + µy)− fy[1− sfpis(t)] (45)
The right-hand side of this inequality refers to the (aggregate) marginal propensity to
save out of total income. The high sensitivity of investment to utilization makes the
short-run profit share depend positively on the utilization rate, i.e., p˜isu > 0.
Changes in short-run profitability have implications for production decisions. We
follow the specification of output expansion in Skott (1989):
Y˙ (t)
Y (t)
= gy(pis(t), e(t)), gypi > 0, g
y
e < 0 (46)
where e(t) ≡ L(t)/L¯(t), L(t) is the number of employed workers and L¯(t) is the labor
force that grows at the natural rate n. Behind (46) is the idea that output expansion is
subject to the adjustment cost and responds positively to short-run profitability which
reflects the condition of the goods market. The state of the labor market affects the
adjustment cost and therefore the speed at which firms expand output. A tight labor
market captured by a high employment rate is associated with a high cost of output
adjustment31 and thus slows down output growth.
30(42) may be seen as a special case of the general specification where accumulation is affected by
the firms’ longer-run expectations of sales growth as well as the current utilization gap. (42) assumes
that the firms’ longer-run expectations of sales growth are anchored by the natural rate of growth.
The analysis based on the general case is given in section 6.1.
31A higher rate of employment, for instance, tends to raise recruitment costs and shop-floor militancy,
which make it difficult for firms to expand production. Skott (1989) [chapter 4] discusses the behavioral
foundation of (46) in greater detail.
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Since labor productivity is assumed to be constant, L(t) is proportional to Y (t).
Therefore we have
e˙(t)
e(t)
=
Y˙ (t)
Y (t)
− n = gy(pis(t), e(t))− n (47)
Using the definition of u(t) and g(t) in (1) and (42), we can derive a differential equation
that governs the trajectory of utilization.
u˙(t)
u(t)
=
Y˙ (t)
Y (t)
− g(t) = gy(pis(t), e(t))− n− φ(u(t)− ud) (48)
Plugging (44) in (47) and (48), we obtain a two dimensional system of utilization
and employment if m(t) and hw(t) are taken as given. In this case the system becomes
recursive and is essentially the same as Skott (1989). Unless the negative effect of the
employment rate on output expansion (gye ) is implausibly large, the dynamical system
of u(t) and e(t) has a unique unstable steady state under certain assumptions. The
source of instability here lies in the interaction between demand and production in the
goods market. Given the Harrodian assumption (45) an increase in utilization raises
aggregate demand and profitability which stimulates output expansion. If the induced
increase in output growth is strong enough to exceed the change in the growth of capital
stock, the utilization rate increases further. The increase in the employment ratio, on
the other hand, tends to constrain output growth and may turn the otherwise exploding
trajectories into perpetual cycles (see Skott (1989)). The cyclical trajectories of u(t)
and e(t) are, however, contingent upon m(t) and hw(t) as these financial variables affect
the profit share. We have shown that the interaction between debt and housing price
dynamics can produce long waves of m(t) and hw(t). Long-run fluctuations of m(t) and
hw(t) sets the long-run trend of profitability around which the system of short cycles
represented by (47) and (48) fluctuates. Figures 7 - 10 illustrate short-run business
cycles fluctuate with reference to long swings.32
6 Extensions
6.1 Interaction between long waves and short cycles
Our long-run assumptions, (2) and (3), implies that the system of long waves is inde-
pendent of that of short cycles, while the latter depends on the former. In addition,
the investment function (42) is calibrated so that capital accumulation takes place at
the natural rate if the actual utilization rate coincides with the desired rate. One may
see these assumptions to be restrictive. The current section relaxes them.
32Figures 7 - 10 are based on the five dimensional system of (37), (38), (39), (47), and (48) where
g(t) = 0.03+1.12(u(t)−ud), gy(t) = −0.035+ 0.101+exp[−64.5pis(t)−14 ln(1.1−e(t))−3.33] , and other parameters
and functions are the same as those in footnote 29.
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Figure 10: Employment
Let us suppose that the pace of accumulation is affected by the firms’ expectations
of sales growth as well as the discrepancy between the actual and the desired rates of
utilization. This new assumption on accumulation behavior replaces (42) by:
g(t) = gye(t) + φ(u(t)− ud) (49)
where gye is the expected growth rate of output (sales). Let us introduce an adaptive
specification of expectations formation:
g˙ye(t) = λ1 · [gy(pis(t), e(t))− gye(t)], λ1 > 0 (50)
Under this adaptive specification, our original accumulation function (42) represents a
special case where firms’ long-term sales expectations are anchored by the natural rate
of growth: λ1 = 0 with g
ye(t) = n.
The assumptions on the long-run average values of the utilization and accumulation
rates are relaxed into
˙¯u(t) = λ2 · [u(t)− u¯(t)] (51)
g¯(t) = gye(t) + φ[u¯(t)− ud] (52)
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The new specification makes the system of long waves also depend on short-run cycles
since u¯(t) and g¯(t) are gradually revised based on the information on the short-run
fluctuations in utilization. Our benchmark model corresponds to the case in which
λ2 = λ1 = 0 with u¯(t) = u
d and gye(t) = n.
The modified assumptions lead to a seven dimensional system with m(t), hw(t),
ρe(t), u(t), e(t), gye and u¯(t) being the corresponding state variables. Analytic results
are difficult to obtain due to high dimensionality, but the intuition based on a perturba-
tion argument suggests that the main feature of the baseline model, the coexistence of
long waves and short cycles, survives if λ1 and λ2 are small. With the small adjustment
parameters, large short-run fluctuations of u(t) and g(t) are filtered through the aver-
aging process (51) and (52) so that their long-run averages exhibit moderate variations.
Changes in the variations of u¯(t) and g¯(t) feed back into long-run financial cycles. A
prolonged period of high utilization with rapid output growth, for instance, tends to
push the average rate u¯(t) above the desired rate ud and increases the long run average
rate of accumulation, thereby reinforcing the expansionary effect of a housing market
boom on the long-run profit share. The higher the values of λ1 and λ2, the stronger the
feedback effect of short cycles on long waves. It is expected, not surprisingly, that high
values of λ1 and λ2 – the fast adjustment of ‘long-run averages’ to ‘actual values’– tend
to obliterate the distinction between long-run trends and short-run variations.33 Our
analysis in previous sections was based on the premise that the conceptual distinction
between long and short cycles is meaningful and pursued the idea in a simplest form
where the long-run trends are invariant to short-run fluctuations.
6.2 Capitalists’ portfolio decisions
This section drops the assumption that capitalists do not hold housing and allows
endogenous changes in their portfolios. Relaxing these assumptions make the analysis
more complicated. First, the purchase and sale of housing by capitalists and workers
changes their respective shares of housing stock even under the assumption of the
fixed total housing stock. The endogenous change in the class share of housing affects
both housing price dynamics and aggregate demand (thus income distribution) under
our specification of consumption/saving behavior. Second, the portfolio decisions are
affected by the relative rates of returns on stocks and housing. The implications of
changes in the rates of return on stocks and housing for aggregate demand and income
distribution are not straightforward. Results generally depend on precise specifications
and parameter values.
Let us assume that capitalists change their holdings of housing and stocks according
33These results are vindicated through numerical experiments. Simulation details are available upon
request.
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to the following adjustment rules:
h˙c(t) = κ1 [η
c(ρe(t), res(t))c
c(t)− hc(t)] , ηcρe > 0, ηcres < 0, κ1 > 0 (53)
˙(t) = κ2 [
∗(ρe(t), res(t))c
c(t)− (t)] , ∗ρe < 0, ∗res > 0, κ2 > 0 (54)
where hc(t) = ph(t)Hc(t)/(p(t)K(t) and (t) = v(t)N(t)/(p(t)K(t)). The idea behind
these specifications is the same as in (14): asset holdings adjust to achieve the desired
asset-consumption ratios, which depend on expected rates of return. The expected rate
of return on stocks is assumed to follow an adaptive process:
r˙es(t) = j · [rs(t)− res(t)], j > 0 (55)
where the rate of return on stocks rs(t) is given by
34
rs(t) =
(1− sf )[Π(t)− δp(t)K(t)]
v(t)N(t)
+ vˆ(t)− pˆ(t) (56)
=
pi(t)ud − δ − n
(t)
+ ˆ(t) + n. (57)
The expression for the rate of return on housing is modified as it depends on the class
share of housing:
ρ(t) = γ(t)hˆc(t) + [1− γ(t)]hˆw(t) + n (58)
where γ(t) is the capitalists’ share in total housing, i.e.
γ(t) = hc(t)/[hc(t) + hw(t)] (59)
The sum of the workers’ consumption and acquisition of housing, zw(t), is given by
zw(t) ≡ cw(t) + hw(t)Hˆw(t) = yw(t) + µ(yw(t), ωw(t)) + nm(t) (60)
It can be shown that the capitalists’ net aquisition of housing equals
hc(t)Hˆc(t) =
[1− γ(t)]h˙c(t)− γ(t)κ[η(·)zw(t)− hw(t)]
1 + κγ(t)
(61)
Finally, the condition for the goods market equilibrium,
f(yc(t), ωc(t)) + hc(t)Hˆc(t) + yw(t) + µ(yw(t), ωw(t)) + nm(t) + n+ δ = ud, (62)
gives us the equilibrium profit share as a function of the six state variables, m(t), hw(t),
hc(t), (t), ρe(t) and res(t) and closes our six dimensional system of differential equations:
pi(t) = pi∗(hc(t), hw(t), (t),m(t), ρe(t), res(t)) (63)
34(57) is obtained from (56) using the firms’ budget constraint (5) and the definition of (t).
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The complete analysis is difficult for the six dimensional system. Given the current
specifications, however, some features of the model may merit attention.
First of all, endogenous changes in capitalists’ portfolios bring into the system a
possibility of boom and bust cycles driven by the stock market. The interaction be-
tween income distribution and stock price dynamics is likely to be mutually reinforcing:
an increase in the rate of return on stocks raises capitalists’ wealth and stimulates ag-
gregate demand; the resulting increase in profitability tends to increase the rate of
return on stocks and tends to justify high expected returns; the increase in capitalists’
consumption also raises the desired holdings of stocks and strengthens the tendency
toward upward instability.
Second, the capitalists’ substitution between stocks and housing may attenuate the
instability potential in the housing market. If the effect of income distribution on
the stock market is strong enough, a boom in the housing market can be short-lived as
increasing profit shares shift capitalists’ portfolios away from housing wealth. The forces
that lead to a boom and bust cycle in the housing market, however, is also influenced by
the workers’ demand for housing. Given the assumption that workers do not own stocks
(meaning there is no substitution effect on the workers’ side), the behavior of the housing
market can be dominated by the workers’ decision on their balance sheet positions. If
workers accumulate their housing wealth faster than capitalists, the workers’ share of
housing γ(t) increases and the movement of housing price inflation will be dominated
by the pace of the workers’ accumulation of housing wealth35, leading to the same kind
of positive feedback as in the baseline model.
Finally, although endogenous shifts in the profit share may constrain the destabiliz-
ing potential created by the workers’ strong demand for housing,36 the very notion of
bubbles suggests that the influence of economic fundamentals on asset prices dynamics
is limited at times and may lag behind. Depending on the absolute and relative size
of adjustment parameters, endogenous cycles of boom and bust can emerge from the
stock or the housing markets. The two markets may be both subject to instability, and
the resulting cycles may be asynchronous. Thus one can imagine a possibility in which
the substitutability of housing and stocks generates bubbles on two assets alternately
rather than completely eliminate destabilizing forces in the economy.
35The precise magnitude of the degree of substitution between stocks and housing is the subject of
empirical studies. To the extent that the degree of substitutability is likely higher for capitalists than
workers, the assumption of no stock holdings by workers may be defensible.
36This is true even for the mechanism of our baseline model. Recall that reductions in cw caused by
worsening income distribution contribute to the emergence of a turning point from a boom to a bust
in the baseline model.
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6.3 Housing supply
The amount of real housing stock available for workers Hw has been assumed to be
constant. This section relaxes this assumption. The purpose of this extension is to
examine the implications of induced changes in housing supply for the dynamics of debt
and asset prices in a stylized manner rather than to build a full-fledged multisectoral
model. The construction of houses, it is assumed, does not require any labor input
but some adjustment cost in the form of the existing final good and the price of homes
is determined at the level just enough to cover this adjustment cost. Given these
assumptions, the housing price relative to output price, ph(t)/p(t), must equal the
amount of the final good required to build h˙w(t) units of houses. It appears reasonable
to assume that the adjustment cost is increasing in the rate of expansion in housing
stock. In particular, we assume that ph(t)/p(t) = ψ−1(hˆw(t)) with ψ′(·) > 0: the new
construction of homes at a rate of hˆw(t) costs ψ−1(hˆw(t)) units of the final good. The
postulated relation between the adjustment cost and the growth of housing stock can
be written as37:
Hˆw(t) = ψ
(
ph(t)
p(t)
)
, ψ′(·) > 0 (64)
i.e., the growth rate of housing units is increasing in the housing price relative to
output price.38 Furthermore, we assume that ψ(·) is bounded from above and below,
and satisfies
lim
x(t)→0
ψ (x(t)) < n < lim
x(t)→∞
ψ (x(t)) (65)
The variability of aggregate housing stock modifies the workers’ budget constraint from
equation (7) to
p(t)Cw(t) + ph(t)H˙w(t) = W (t)− i(t)M(t) + M˙(t) (66)
or
Cw(t)
K(t)
+ hw(t)ψ
(
ph(t)
p(t)
)
= yw(t) + µ
(
yw(t), ωb(t)
)
+ nm(t) (67)
In words, the workers’ net income plus borrowing is used to finance the net acquisition
of newly built homes as well as their consumption. The goods market equilibrium
condition is rewritten as
p(t)Cw(t) + ph(t)H˙w(t) + p(t)Cc(t) + p(t)I(t) = p(t)Y (t) (68)
or [
Cw(t)
K(t)
+ hw(t)ψ
(
ph(t)
p(t)
)]
+
Cc(t)
K(t)
+ n+ δ = u (69)
37The specification of housing supply (64) and its interpretation are suggested by Peter Skott.
38The similar assumption on the relation between housing supply and housing price is also found in
Poterba (1984).
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Residential investment is a component of aggregate demand, but the expression for the
equilibrium profit share (23) does not change. Under the current specification, the level
of aggregate demand contributed by workers is determined solely by the sum of the
workers’ net income and borrowing (see the right-hand side of (69)). The introduction
of the construction sector affects the division of workers’ spending into consumption
and housing investment but does not change the sum of those two components.39
The variability of housing stock requires the change in the expression for capital
gains. Let us define ξ(t) ≡ Hw(t)
K(t)
. The definition of hw(t) implies
ph(t)
p(t)
=
hw(t)
ξ(t)
(70)
and
ρ(t) ≡ R(ξ(t))
hw(t)
+
[
p˙h(t)
ph(t)
− p˙(t)
p(t)
]
=
R(ξ(t))
hw(t)
+
[
h˙w(t)
hw(t)
− ξ˙(t)
ξ(t)
]
(71)
where ρ(t) is redefined as the rate of return on housing by including not only capital
gains but also the rental rate of housing services, R(ξ(t)). We further assume that
R′(ξ(t)) < 0. The negative dependence of the rental price of housing services on
housing stock follows a standard argument (for instance, see Poterba (1984)).40
From the definition of ξ(t), we have
ξ˙(t)
ξ(t)
= Hˆw(t)− Kˆ(t) = ψ
(
hw(t)
ξ(t)
)
− n (72)
Substituting (14) and (71) in (15), the dynamics of the expected rate of return on
housing can be written as
ρ˙e(t) = ν
(
R(ξ(t)) + h˙w(t)
hw(t)
− ξ˙(t)
ξ(t)
− ρe(t)
)
(73)
= ν
[
R(ξ(t)) + κ {η(ρe(t))cw(t)− hw(t)}
hw(t)
− ψ
(
hw(t)
ξ(t)
)
+ n− ρe(t)
]
Equations (37), (38), (72) and (73) constitute a four-dimensional system of differ-
ential equations. On a steady growth path, housing and capital stock grow at the same
39Note that this feature – no effect of the construction sector on the goods market equilibrium
condition – results from our special assumption on the construction sector – construction requires no
labor input but only a certain amount of final goods in the form of adjustment cost – as well as our
specification of workers’ consumption behavior. Thus it should not be taken as a general feature.
40Suppose the demand for the flow of housing services is decreasing in the rental rate and the flow
supply is increasing in the stock of houses. The temporary equilibrium between supply and demand
makes the equilibrium rental rate decreasing in the stock of houses.
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rate n so as to maintain ξ(t) at a constant level: Hˆw(t) = Kˆ(t) = n. Assumption
(65) ensures the existence of hw(t)/ξ(t) that satisfies Hˆw(t) = n. Thus we can write
ξ(t) = hw(t)/ψ−1(n). The steady-state value of ρ(t) and ρe(t) must equal the rental
rate of housing services, ρ(t) = ρe(t) = R(ξ(t)) = R(hw(t)/ψ−1(n)), and hw(t) must be
constant. The steady state requirements boil down to
η
(
R
(
hw(t)
ψ−1(n)
))
cw(m˜(hw(t)))− hw(t) = 0 (74)
Note that the left-hand side of (74) is still decreasing in hw(t)41 and assumptions (40)
and (41) ensure the existence of a unique value of hw(t), namely h∗∗, which satisfies
(74). The steady-state value of ξ(t) is given by ξ∗∗ = h∗∗/ψ−1(n), the steady-state rate
of return on housing R(ξ∗∗), and the steady-state debt ratio m˜(h∗∗).
The increase in the dimensionality due to the construction sector complicates the
stability analysis but the main analytic results in previous sections carry over to the
current extension if R′(·) and ψ′(·) are sufficiently small. In this case, the 3D subsys-
tem of (37), (38) and (73) is semi-separable from the dynamics of ξ(t), equation (72).
Therefore, proposition 6, which is based on the inspection of the 3 × 3 sub-matrix of
the full Jacobian matrix, must hold true for the dynamics of m(t), hw(t) and ρ(t). With
the low price sensitivity of housing supply (low ψ′(·)), the system continues to retain
the destabilizing potential under the postulates in the baseline model.42
The high sensitivity of housing supply to the relative price (a large ψ′(·)), however,
will exert a stabilizing force for an intutive reason. The elastic supply of homes tends
to undermine capital gains and therefore weaken the self-reinforcing positive feedback
between housing demand and capital gains.
7 Conclusion
There exists a steady state in our model where the debt ratio and the actual level of
housing wealth remain at the desired levels and the expectations are fulfilled. How-
ever, we did not presuppose that such an expectational equilibrium is instantaneously
attained. Instead we asked whether plausible behavioral rules would justify the con-
vergence process to the equilibrium. The convergence may fail and perpetual cycles of
41Note that the partial derivative of the left-hand side of (74) with respect to hw(t) equals η
′R′
ψ−1(n) +
ηcw′m˜′ − 1 < 0.
42If the housing construction is driven by the expected housing price, phe(t), rather than the actual
price, i.e., Hˆ(t) = ψ(phe(t)/p(t)), and the process of expectations formation is adaptive, destabilizing
forces of the system are likely to be stronger. The expected housing price that lags behind the actual
price during a boom means the speed of the housing construction is more sluggish than in the case
where the construction is determined by the actual price. Next, the construction may require borrowing
and this aspect also affect the implication of construction activities for housing market dynamics, but
our simple specification of housing construction does not allow us to pursue such an issue.
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booms and busts emerge under the prevalence of extrapolating rules. A fast adjust-
ment of expectations toward actual outcomes is in fact destabilizing. Advocates for the
rational expectations hypothesis may dismiss the assumption of adaptive expectations
and see the instability results built on out-of-equilibrium dynamics as irrelevant, but
the approach taken in this paper may be justified by its realism.43
Motivated by Minsky’s financial instability hypothesis, we have shown that the
interaction between household debt accumulation and housing price dynamics can gen-
erate a prolonged period of expansion followed by a long downturn. Our model provides
an explanation of two distinct cycles: long waves and short-run business cycles. Since
the early 1980s, the U.S economy had experienced a long period of upward expansions
with relatively small downturns in the 1991 and the 2001 recessions in the run-up to
the Great Recession. During this period, the economics profession was increasingly
dominated by an optimistic perspective about not only economic fundamentals and the
power of monetary policy but also the state of the profession itself44. Such optimism,
however, may have been a mere symptom of an upward phase of Minskian long waves.
Our analysis mainly concerns what Minsky called ‘a skeletal model of a capitalist
economy,’ abstracting from a number of important aspects. The banking sector in
our model, for instance, is highly stylized and has an obvious limitation in capturing
Minsky’s stress on the role of financial innovation and institutional changes in the
financial sector. In addition, we have paid little attention to the analysis of stabilization
policies as well as open economy complications. Furthermore, the analysis of financial
instability in this paper needs to be complemented by careful empirical and historical
analyses. Addressing related issues are left for future study.
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Appendix A: Derivation of equation (14)
Suppose that fundamentalists and chartists are different only in their expectations
on capital gains: fundamentalists know the correct equilibrium value of the rate of
capital gains (in our model, ρe(t) = n), whereas chartists use an adaptive rule along
the lines of (14) and (15). Suppose that s is the chartists’ share of housing wealth
and the mass of total investors is normalized to one. Denoting the housing demand
by individual chartists and fundamentalists as ht(t) and hf (t) respectively, we can
36
write h˙f (t) = κ[η(n)cw(t) − hf (t)] and h˙t(t) = κ[η(ρe(t))cw(t) − ht(t)]. Since hw(t) =
(1− s)hf (t) + sht(t), we have:
h˙w(t) = (1− s)κ[η(n)cw(t)− hf (t)] + sκ[η(ρe(t))cw(t)− ht(t)]
= κ [(1− s)η(n)cw(t) + sη (ρe(t))cw(t))− hw(t)] (75)
Setting η(ρe(t))cw(t) ≡ (1− s)η(n)cw(t) + sη(ρe(t))cw(t), we obtain (14) from (75). As
long as the share of chartists is non-zero, ηρe = sηρe is non-zero and positive. The
higher the share of chartists the larger the response of aggregate desired portfolio to
changes in expected capital gains.
Appendix B: Proof of Propositions 3 and 7
Proof of Proposition 3 Let cw(m(t)) = cw. Equation (17) and assumption 36
implies
κηcw < h˙(s) + κh(s) < κηcw
Multiplity this by exp(κs) and integrating it over [0, t] gives us
[exp(κt)− 1]ηcw < exp(κt)hw(t)− h(0) < [exp(κt)− 1]ηcw
Mutiplying by exp(−κt) and rearranging the terms, we have:
[1− exp(−κt)]ηcw + exp(−κt)h(0) < hw(t) < [1− exp(−κt)]ηcw + exp(−κt)h(0)
Since 0 < exp(−κt) ≤ 1 over t ∈ [0,∞), we have:
h ≤ hw(t) ≤ h
where h = min{ηcw, h(0)} and h = max{ηcw, h(0)}. There hw(t) is bounded. Since
h˙w(t) is continuous in hw(t) and η is bounded by assumption, h˙w(t) is bounded as well.
To prove the boundedness of ρe(t), consider
ρ(t) =
h˙w(t)
hw(t)
+ n
Since h˙w(t) and hw(t) are bounded, ρ(t) is clearly bounded as long as h(0) > 0. Note
that if hw(t) = 0, ρ(t) may explode but if h(0) > 0, this case is ruled out: η > 0 by
assumption and therefore hw(t) > h ≡ min{ηcw, h(0)} >0 if h(0) > 0. Because ρ(t) is
bounded, the same method as in the proof of the boundedness of hw(t) can be applied
to prove that of ρe(t) by using (15). Since the trajectories are bounded and (η(n)cw, n)
is a unique unstable fixed point, if −κ+ ν
(
κη′
η
− 1
)
> 0, the trajectories of hw(t) and
ρe(t) must converge to a closed orbit according to the Poincare-Bendixson theorem. 
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Proof of Proposition 7 To prove the boundedness of the trajectories of the 3D
system, we first construct a set on the (m(t), hw(t)) space from which any trajectory
cannot escape once it enters independently of the value of ρe(t) (i.e., the projection
onto the (m(t), hw(t)) space of a positively invariant set). We can confine our initial
analysis to the (m(t), hw(t)) space thanks to the boundedness of η(ρe), i.e., assumption
(36). Consider the following set:
A ≡{(m(t), h(t)) ∈ [m1 − a,m2 + a]× [h1 − a, h2 + a] |
a > 0, ηc˜w(m1, h1) = h1, ηc
w(m2, h2) = h2,mi = m˜(hi), i = 1, 2}
where a sufficiently small positive a can be chosen for A to include {[m1,m2]× [h1, h2]}
as its proper subset and to ensure m1−a > 0 and h1−a > 0. It can be easily shown that
the gradient at any point on the boundaries of A points inward the set. It can be also
shown that any trajectory from an arbitrary initial condition eventually enter A. The
intuitive explanation is as follows: for any given ρe(t), the 2D sub-system (m(t), h(t))
has a unique fixed point and the fixed point is locally stable since the trace and the
determinant of the subsystem are negative and positive, respectively. The fixed point
depends continuously and monotonically on the value of η(ρe(t)). The set of all fixed
points of the 2D subsystem is a finite and closed segment on the m˙(t)-nullcline (Note
that the h˙w(t)-nullcline depends continuously and monotonically on the value of ρe(t),
but the area it spans is limited by the boundedness of the η-function). We can choose
a set that includes the set of fixed points as a proper subset. Such a set has the desired
property: any trajectory cannot escape from it. A is an example of those sets with such
a property. In our proof, we used the fact that the determinant of the 2D sub-system
is positive, which can be checked:
FmGh − FhGm = κ
1 + µy − fy(1− sf ) × [{rfysf + fω(1 + α)}(µy + ηµω)
+ µω{1− (1− sf )fy}+ n{µy + ηµωfy(1− sf )}] > 0
Since m(t) and hw(t) are bounded, the boundedness of ρe(t) follows from the argu-
ment similar to that in proposition 3. 
Appendix C: Proof of Proposition 5 and 6
Let us consider the following Jacobian Matrix evaluated at the stationary point.
J =
 Fm Fhw 0Gm Gh Gρe
ν Gm
hw∗ ν
Gh
hw∗ ν
(
Gρe
hw∗ − 1
)
 (76)
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We have seen Fm < 0 and Fhw > 0 in (31) and (32). We also have: Gh = κ(ηc˜
w
h −1) < 0
and Gρe = κη
′c˜w(·) > 0.
Let us define
b1 ≡ Gρe
hw∗
− 1
b2 ≡ FmGh − FhwGm > 0
b3 ≡ Fm +Gh < 0
b4 ≡
(
Gρe
hw∗
− 1
)
Fm −Gh
Using the definition of bi’s, we have
tr(J) = b3 + b1ν
Σ3i=1Ji = b2 + b4ν
det(J) = −b2ν < 0
−tr(J)(Σ3i=1Ji) + det(J) = A0 + A1ν + A2ν2
where Ji’s are the first principal minors of J , and
A0 = −b2b3 > 0
A1 = −b1b2 − b3b4 − b2
A2 = −b1b4
Proof of Proposition 5 The Routh-Hurwitz necessary and sufficient condition for
the asymptotic local stability is:
tr(J) < 0, Σ3i=1Ji > 0
det(J) < 0, − tr(J)(Σ3i=1Ji) + det(J) > 0
As ν → 0,
tr(J) → b3 < 0 (77)
Σ3i=1Ji → b2 > 0 (78)
−tr(J)(Σ3i=1Ji) + det(J) → A0 > 0 (79)
It is readily seen that for a sufficiently small positive value of ν, the signs of tr(J),
Σ3i=1Ji and −tr(J)(Σ3i=1Ji) + det(J) should retain those of (77), (78) and (79) with
det(J) being negative, thus satisfying the Routh-Hurwitz stability criterion. 
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Proof of Proposition 6 To prove the existence of a limit cycle for the system of
(37)-(39) , we will show that the Jacobian matrix (76) evaluated at (m∗(ν), h∗(ν),
ρe∗(ν), ν), where (m∗(ν), h∗(ν), ρe∗(ν)) is a fixed point of the system, has a negative
real root and a pair of imaginary roots. If we denote the eigenvalues of the Jacobian
matrix as λ(ν) and β(ν) ± θ(ν)i, we need to show that λ(νb) < 0, β(νb) = 0, and
θ(νb) 6= 0. νb is called a Hopf bifurcation point. The Routh-Hurwitz criterion states
that the Jacobian matrix will have a negative real root and a pair of pure imaginary
roots if and only if:
tr(J) < 0, Σ3i=1Ji > 0 (80)
det(J) < 0, −tr(J)(Σ3i=1Ji) + det(J) = 0
Let us suppose that b1 > 0 and consider two cases: b4 > 0 and b4 < 0
Case 1. b4 > 0. We then have A2 < 0. Since A0 > 0, the quadratic equation, A0 +
A1ν + A2ν
2 = 0, has one positive and one negative roots. Choose the positive
root and denote it as ν∗. ν∗ is given by
ν∗ ≡ A1 +
√
A21 + 4A0|A2|
2|A2| > 0
where −tr(J)(J1 +J2 +J3) + det(J) = 0. Because b2 > 0 and b4 > 0, J1 +J2 +
J3 = b2 + b4ν
∗ > 0. tr(J) = 0 if ν = b3
b1
> 0. It implies that if ν = b3
b1
, then
−tr(J)(J1 + J2 + J3) + det(J) = det(J) < 0. For any ν > 0, −tr(J)(J1 + J2 +
J3) + det(J) = det(J) < 0 only if ν > ν
∗. Therefore, ν∗ < b3
b1
. Since tr(J) is
increasing in ν (b1 > 0), ν
∗ < b3
b1
implies that tr(J) < 0 at ν = ν∗. Therefore,
we conclude that if ν = ν∗, the Routh-Hurwitz criterion (80) is satisfied and,
therefore, λ(ν∗) < 0, β(ν∗∗) = 0, and θ(ν∗) 6= 0. For a later purpose, note that
the first derivative of −tr(J)(J1 +J2 +J3)+det(J) with respect to ν is negative
at ν = ν∗, i.e. A1 + 2A2ν∗ < 0.
Case 2. Next suppose that b4 < 0. We then have A2 > 0, A1 < 0 and A0 > 0.
Furthermore, a straightforward calculation shows that:
A21 − 4A0A2 = (b1b2 − b3b4)2 + 2(b1b2 + b3b4)b2 + b22 > 0
The last inequality follows from the fact that b1 > 0, b2 > 0, b3 < 0 and b4 < 0.
Therefore, the quadratic equation, A0 + A1ν + A2ν
2 = 0, has two distinct
positive roots. Denote the smaller as ν∗∗.
ν∗∗ ≡ |A1| −
√
A21 − 4A0A2
2A2
> 0
It is simple to show that tr(J) < 0 and J1 + J2 + J3 > 0 at ν = ν
∗∗. Therefore,
we conclude that if ν = ν∗∗, the Routh-Hurwitz criterion (80) is satisfied.
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It remains to show that β′(ν∗) 6= 0 and β′(ν∗∗) 6= 0, respectively. Tedious algebra
leads to:
β′(ν∗) =
2θ(ν∗)[b1b2 + b3b4 + b2 + 2b1b4ν∗]
4λ(ν∗)2θ(ν∗) + 4θ(ν∗)3
=
−2θ(ν∗)[A1 + 2A2ν∗]
4λ(ν∗)2θ(ν∗) + 4θ(ν∗)3
> 0
β′(ν∗∗) =
2θ(ν∗∗) [b4λ(ν∗∗) + b1θ(ν∗∗)2 + b2]
4λ(ν∗∗)2θ(ν∗∗) + 4θ(ν∗∗)3
> 0
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